Tuesday, 21 June 2011

Diplomatic Loyalties


Imagine this. You are a diplomat representing your birth country, but your heritage lies with two other states from your parents and you are married to a non-native national. You are proud of your heritage, you love your family, and you are a strong supporter of the country you declared yourself to. One day, your country starts a fight with your partner's country, and you have to lead the negotiations which may split the country, create political refugees, and potentially turn to war. Where does your loyalty lie?

This is quite an intricate question that many diplomats have to struggle with. As a British woman from Bangladeshi origin married to an American, I wonder what I would do in that situation and find myself thinking hard for quite some time in silence. Of course, my obligation would be to my country but this would lead problems within my personal life too. How does one separate such loyalty? This thought process was spurred on by an interesting article I found written by former UK Ambassador Charles Crawford, published in the June 2011 edition of Diplomat, which I have abridged and edited below to share with you. I feel that I will need to clarify my self-identity and fully prepare myself into the diplomatic world where my personal and professional loyalty may one day conflict.


In his article, Charles Crawford highlighted the case of Anwar Choudhury, a senior British diplomat of Bangladeshi origin who joined the Foreign and Commonwealth Office after working for the Ministry of Defence and Cabinet Office. He served as High Commissioner to Bangladesh but was subjected to an attempted assassination in 2004 by local extremists enraged by Mr Choudhury's sense of 'belonging' to the UK.

Crawford then highlighted how "the double agent who did the most damage to British intelligence operations was George Blake, another person with ambiguous private loyalties: his mother was Dutch, his father a naturalised British subject of Turkish/Jewish origin. Blake ruthlessly betrayed dozens of agents who were working for the UK against the Soviet Union, many of whom were believed to have been executed. Sentenced to 42 years imprisonment for his treasonable activities, Blake famously escaped from prison in 1966 and made his way to Moscow where he lived in comfort and honour. He insisted that he had never felt British: 'To betray, you first have to belong. I never belonged,' he said."

"All this
suggest that central to the idea of loyalty is self-identity. Few diplomats go through a career without having grave doubts at different points about the morality or wisdom of the instructions coming from HQ." Yet Crawford notes that only a small number of diplomats resign from instructions coming from HQ. I instantly think of former British diplomat Carne Ross, who resigned during UN negotiations for the Iraq War and has since set up his own organisation Independent Diplomat to help territories and groups become formally recognised as states. 
Crawford goes on to say that - "Different reasons and rationalisations are found for staying loyal even under extreme circumstances (for example when the leadership of the state the diplomat represents is busy brutalising its own people)." To this, 
Crawford brings up the fate of Danish diplomat Paul Bang-Jensen who took his own life in 1959. Accordingly, "Bang-Jensen refused to hand over to his superiors at the UN a list of names of Hungarians who in strict confidence had testified against communist atrocities in Hungary. Bang-Jensen feared (not without reason) that top UN processes had been infiltrated by communists who wanted to retaliate against the relatives of those who sought to publicise the truth. His unwavering loyalty to honesty rather than the demands of the UN hierarchy cost him his job and led to his tragic end."


The emergence of Bangladesh as an independent state in 1971/72 gives a striking of what happens when one state splits in two. As Bangladesh's struggle to break from Pakistan intensified, Pakistan's diplomat Abul Fateh faced a painful dilemma in deciding whether to stay on as Pakistan's Ambassador to Iraq, or choose an uncertain future with his native land. Fateh decided to join Bangladesh which caused the Pakistani government to furiously denounce his defection. However, in Fateh's decision, he went on to play a distinguished role in establishing Bangladesh's new diplomatic service and represented his country in Paris, London and Algiers. That said, the current Libya case has given rise to a spectacular number of high profile diplomatic changes of side, with one Libyan ambassador after another denouncing support for the opposition forces struggling to bring down the Gaddafi regime

Crawford surmised, "...unwelcome problems quickly arise if some diplomats in an embassy switch sides but others don't. Who is running the local Libyan embassy for the purpose of carrying on routine diplomatic business? Who gets invited to which functions? Does a Libyan diplomat who has announced a switch of loyalty still get diplomatic immunity? What about the official embassy care? What if the uprising fails and Gaddafi wins - must we throw these people out of the Libyan embassy? How these questions and many others are answered will depend upon local circumstances and, perhaps, the personalities concerned."


Crawford notes that the worst outcome would be if the violence has no obvious end in sight, which makes us question the outcomes of the Arab Spring. Until now, the Middle East has yet to have its own revelation so there are bound to be political resistance. The Gaddafi elite are clinging on to power despite NATO
forces blowing up significant quantities of military equipment. The Libya drama exemplifies the greatest challenge to any diplomat's loyalty to his/her country: what to do if the country slumps into civil war or even disappears altogether?


So, what would you do in such position? What would British diplomats do if Scotland holds a referendum and opts for independence? How do diplomats cope with the instructions of HQ if every nerve in their body rebels against it? Would you rather trust the government you work for, or the family that have always been by your side? It's not an easy question to answer, but it is one that all diplomats must one day be prepared for. 


Full article: http://tinyurl.com/6hs6vjm

Sunday, 12 June 2011

Conflict within Conflicts

To celebrate the 10th anniversary of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom organised a special autumn seminar in 2010 to analyse the objectives and successes of the resolution.

For the first time, a UN resolution provided women worldwide with a legal tool of empowerment which helps to assert their demands against violence and injustice. In a major conference in Beijing 1994, women challenged the realist concept of security by renegotiating gender at the heart of peace and conflict policy-making. UNSCR 1325 puts women squarely in the centre of security issues, promising gender mainstreaming into institutional structures that is otherwise male-dominated, and encouraging governments to be represented by women in key political positions as a means to achieve equality and gender neutrality.

Ten years on, and the progress for gender equality is slow due to a lack of political integrity and resources. At this seminar, Professor Nicola Pratt of Warwick University highlighted how the resolution fails to factor in the gender stereotypes of victims and peace-builders, and does not address imperialist and capitalist ideologies that guarantee national sovereignty. The language fostered in the resolution also does not rightly condemn war, nor does it prosecute gender violence created by armed conflict and military activities. The resolution does not explicitly define the meaning of ‘conflict’, which is probably why countries, such as the United Kingdom has only adapted the resolution to its foreign policy.

When we think of the word ‘conflict’ within an international political context, countries in the Middle East or Central America may pop up in reference to drug cartels, dictator regimes, or internal repression. But when thinking of conflict issues in politically stable countries, I think of youth gangs, gun crimes, racial and sexual discrimination, and political ideology.

For the most part, Britain is a relatively safe country with a democratic and diverse society that adheres to strict national laws. But like many other metropolitan cities, London isn’t without its fair share of trouble. Conflict in the UK exists in the form of forced marriages, rape, domestic violence, living with firearms, gender oppression, and gang violence, all of which are prevalent in British news and policies.

Three years ago, the Metropolitan Police started a massive crackdown against youth gang violence in inner London areas, stating clearly that anyone harbouring weapons like knives or guns would be sent straight to jail. According to Carlene Firmin of Race on the Agenda, applying UNSCR 1325 into these forms of violence creates problems of integration because domestic or gang violence is not formally recognised as a ‘conflict’. Carlene notes that birth and association is a determinant of victimisation for girls and women associated with serious youth violence and criminal gangs across the country and are often made scapegoats in police investigations. For example, when the Metropolitan Police started its anti-weapons campaign, gang girlfriends would be prosecuted for harbouring weapons that were forced onto them in the first place. Race on the Agenda found that girlfriends of gang leaders were subjected to threats, violence and domestic abuse, and were pressured into joining gangs by her partner without any safe exit strategy. If we adapt this scenario into the Democratic Republic of Congo, UNSCR 1325 will instantly apply, but the same cannot be said for the UK despite apparent gender injustice. As a type of conflict, gang violence deals with shifting control and power in relationship in the same way as violence is created in less urban surroundings.

Like many resolutions, UNSCR 1325 is critiqued for speaking for all women and has a ‘one size fits all’ bandage in resolving all types of conflict, ignoring different political systems, culture and economies. When framing UNSCR 1325 into British social conflicts, a high level of disillusionment is apparent in our political system. Young women are invisible when developing, testing and implementing policies and will continue to be excluded if the definition of ‘conflict’ remains as vague and aloof to urban conditions as it is now.

Recommendation: Domestic law should not override international policies but be considered in sync with domestic consultations and policy framework.